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Introduction 
Research into the populist radical right (PRR) in Europe identifies immigration as a key issue for such 
parties (Mudde 2007). While the relationship between immigration and the radical right vote has 
been firmly established at the level of individual attitudes (e.g. van der Brug et al, 2000; Van der 
Brug and Van Spanje, 2009;), there is still a need for a better understanding of how the presence of 
immigrants may shape support for the radical right spatially. The first ecological models looking at 
socio-economic conditions of PRR support using a variety of operationalisations across countries 
found a strong association between immigration and PRR vote (e.g. Jackman and Volpert, 1996). 
More recent work confirms that immigration has a significant and robust effect on voting for the 
radical right at the meso-level (Georgiadou et al., 2018). Multi-level tests have tended to confirm 
these findings (e.g. Berning, 2016). 
The link between ecological and individual explanations of immigration on PRR support implies 
causal links between immigrant presence, ethnocentric attitudes and PRR vote. Explanations of such 
links are generally based upon the two principal social psychological theories of prejudice, namely 
ethnic competition and intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Quillian, 1995). According to ethnic 
competition theory, symbolic perceptions of immigration-related threats may increase anti-
immigrant sentiments, thus fuelling support for the radical right. Contact theory postulates that, 
under conditions of high-quality contact, intergroup contact with immigrants may reduce prejudice, 
and by extension, the contemporary literature expects that this will decrease support for PRR 
parties. Empirically, however, the recent literature on the relationship between immigrant presence, 
immigration attitudes and voting for the PRR illustrates the complexity of the mechanisms at play, 
showing mixed results according to scale of measurement and/or immigration proxy, and notably 
failing to account fully for why high levels of support for the PRR may be found in local areas with 
low or virtually no immigrant presence. 
Combining insights from both contact and ethnic competition theories, this paper seeks to examine 
further the link between immigration and the radical right, and to resolve somewhat the puzzle of 
PRR support in areas of low immigrant presence. Specifically, we ďƵŝůĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ŚĂůŽ effect ?
developed by earlier contextual studies of the PRR vote to account spatially for the phenomenon of 
higher levels of PRR electoral support in areas adjacent to and at further distance from zones of high 
immigrant population, but ůŽǁĞƌŝŶƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ?ĂƌĞĂƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ (Bon and Cheylan, 1988; 
Bowyer, 2008; Rydgren and Ruth, 2013). 
                                                          
 Authors are listed in alphabetical order. We wish to thank Kai Arzheimer, Carl Berning, Eelco Harteveld, Nick 
Hood, Yoshi Kobayashi, Gayle Yeandle and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Data and 
syntax files are available from Mendeley - [LINK TO BE PROVIDED ON PUBLICATION]. Research for this article 
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In its original formulation, the halo theory postulates that individuals living adjacent to ethnically 
diverse areas experience sporadic contact with immigrants through daily commuting and retail 
activities, but lack quality contact and therefore will be more likely to perceive those groups as a 
threat, resulting in higher support for the PRR. In contrast, individuals living in areas with high 
immigrant presence experience quality intergroup contact which reduces their prejudice and in turn 
their propensity to vote for the PRR (Perrineau 1998). By linking context with attitudes and 
behaviour, the concept of halo potentially provides new insights into the mechanisms underpinning 
the contextual effects of immigration on voting for the PRR. However, the majority of tests of the 
halo effect to date have relied exclusively upon qualitative accounts and/or ecological inference, 
mapping areas of migrant population and PRR support. A link to individual behaviour, let alone to 
individual attitudes, has only been tested recently (Klinger et al, 2017; Savelkoul et al., 2017; David 
et al., 2018; Janssen et al. 2019), not yet in the French case, and not systematically in terms of halo 
effect. 
This paper fills this empirical gap by focusing on individual behaviour, and the effect of local context 
on this, to understand better the presence of a mechanism between immigrant presence and PRR 
support. Drawing on a unique set of geocoded data from a survey of French voters, we present a 
first test of the halo effect at both the ecological and individual level, using a series of multi-level 
models to test for evidence of such an effect on the vote for the Front National (FN) in the first-
round of the 2017 French presidential election. The first section discusses the concept of halo in 
relation to existing theories of ethnic contact and competition. We then turn to describing the 
survey and methodology, before we present our main findings. We find evidence for a significant 
curvilinear halo effect at the individual level, amongst voters living around and at further distance 
from areas with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations. A series of alternative 
specifications confirm that this effect is robust to different model specifications and, as far as these 
can be tested, to competing theories such as ethnic change and residential segregation, as well as 
the regional composition of the immigrant population in ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚs. Moreover, 
the halo is independent of the general socio-economic context in which voters live, tested by 
unemployment and education levels, as well as socio-demographic voter attributes. Most 
importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of halo effects on associated individual attitudes 
related to PRR voting, thus providing a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms 
linking subjective experience of immigration with radical right vote. 
 
Immigration and the PRR vote  
The voluminous body of research on the PRR vote has established a strong link between immigration 
and support for the radical right. Typically, PRR parties formulate a nativist platform framing 
immigration as a threat to the welfare and cultural fabric of Western societies (Mudde 2007). In 
individual vote choice models, opposition to immigration has been identified over time as one of the 
ŵĂŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚŝŶĂůĚƌŝǀĞƌƐŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞĚŝǀĞƌƐĞǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ǀĂŶĚĞƌƌƵŐ
et al, 2000; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009; Zhirkov, 2014; Oesch and 
Rennwald, 2018). Earlier ecological studies have found a strong relationship between immigration 
and PRR voting (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003; Georgiadou et al., 2018). 
Multi-level tests have confirmed the role of anti-immigration attitudes as one of the main drivers of 
the PRR vote (Lubbers et al, 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Berning, 2016; Edo et al. 2019). 
Explanations of such links between immigrant presence, ethnocentric attitudes and PRR vote are 
generally based upon mechanisms derived from social psychological theories of prejudice, most 
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notably conflicting theories of intergroup contact, on the one hand, and ethnic competition, on the 
other hand ?dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĚƌĂǁƐƵƉŽŶůůƉŽƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ
certain specific conditions, the existence of significant cooperative interactions with minority groups 
will produce a reduction in ethnic prejudice and stereotyping of members of these groups, and 
therefore a decrease in support for the PRR. Similar research stresses the importance of such 
personalized interactions, intergroup friendships  ?WĞƚƚŝŐƌĞǁ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĂŶĐĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?
(Cook 1962).  
According to theories of ethnic competition, majority ethnic groups are held to be in direct 
competition with immigrant groups, and other minority populations, over both materialist  W i.e. 
economic  W and symbolic  W i.e. social and cultural ?  resources, and from this perceive a need to 
defend their own interests and identities (Tajfel et al, 1971). Other things being equal, they will 
therefore be more likely to support nativist parties that defend the principles of exclusive access to 
national assets  W in other words, a welfare-chauvinist ideology (Mewes and Mau, 2013)  W and of the 
promotion of ethno-cultural homogeneity of the majority group (Rydgren, 2007). 
 
Contextual effects of immigrant presence 
Earlier studies found that the local context is an important determinant of individual attitudes 
towards immigrants (e.g. Middleton 1976). Empirically, recent studies illustrate, however, the 
complexity of the relationship between immigrant presence, immigration attitudes and voting for 
the PRR, showing mixed results, and notably failing to account fully for high PRR support in areas 
with low immigrant presence. Using a large-scale individual-level data set with geocodes, Savelkoul 
et al. (2017) examine the effect of neighbourhood ethnic composition on individual voting for the 
radical right in the Netherlands, and find that ethnic minority density is positively related to the 
likelihood to vote for the Party for Freedom (PVV). Kaufmann (2017) shows on the other hand that 
support for the United Kingdom Independence Party is negatively correlated with ethnic diversity, 
but underlines the role of change in immigration, specifically increases in immigration population 
producing higher individual PRR support. In their recent meta-analysis of ethnic context and 
immigration attitudes, Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018) emphasize the role of ethnic change and 
report a significant association between increase in ethnic diversity and elevated threat. Other 
studies such as Halla et al. (2017) and Patana (2018) also emphasize the role of immigration change 
and find that the inflow of immigrants into a local community significantly increases the vote share 
for the radical right. 
In the Dutch case, Janssen et al. (2019) find that, at the local level, the effect of ethnic minority 
presence on the intention to vote for the PVV is curvilinear and is higher in areas with intermediate 
levels of immigration, compared with low or very high percentages of non-western minorities where 
support for the radical right is lower. On the other hand, van Wijk et al. (2019) find no effect for local 
ethnic composition and local economic conditions on voting for the PVV after controlling for 
individual characteristics. Earlier ecological studies such as Biggs and Knauss (2012) report a 
significant relationship between minority group size and support for the radical right, while 
emphasizing the effect of residential segregation. The authors note that support for the radical right 
is higher in cities where minorities are sufficiently numerous to be perceived as a threat, and where 
they are highly segregated (2012: 643). 
One reason for these mixed findings is methodological and may relate to the immigration indicators 
that are used. A recent meta-analysis of structural factors of radical right voting in Western Europe 
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suggests that the significance and direction of the relationship for immigration is highly dependent 
on the type of proxy used (Amengay and Stockemer 2019). More importantly, research indicates 
that contact and threat theories operate differently at different levels of aggregation. The 
comparative study by Weber (2015) illustrates such a  ‘ŵŽĚŝĨŝĂďůĞĂƌĞĂůƵŶŝƚƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? and 
demonstrates that the effect size and statistical significance of immigrant presence vary with the 
delimitation of the spatial units of analysis. The meta-analysis of studies of ethnic context and 
immigration attitudes by Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018) finds a non-linear relationship between 
ethnic context and threat, with higher diversity predicting threat responses at the smallest and 
largest scales, whereas in medium-size units such as neighbourhoods, diversity is associated with 
reduced threat. Schlueter and Scheepers suggest that, at local level, the  Sprimary impact of minority 
group size will be an enhancement of opportunities for intergroup contact ?ǁŚŝůĞŝŶlarger spatial 
contexts ? Soutgroup size [is] associated with an enhancement of threat perceƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? (2010: 293). 
Similarly, Biggs and Knauss (2012) posit that different mechanisms may be at play at different 
geographical scales. Empirically, David et al. (2018) show that the size and significance of the impact 
of immigration on extreme right voting and anti-immigrant attitudes vary by different scales of 
measurement. The work by Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015) suggests that negative correlations tend 
to be higher at smaller scales. Typically, studies of contextual factors of the FN vote in France 
identify a positive correlation between immigrant presence and FN vote at higher levels of 
aggregation, while the correlation becomes negative at the municipality level (Rojon, 2013; della 
Posta, 2013). 
 
Hypothesizing a  ?hĂůŽ ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚ 
We still lack a better explanation, then, of how the presence of immigrants may shape support for 
the radical right, and we need more solid empirical evidence of the mechanisms that link the 
presence of immigrants to immigration attitudes and ultimately to the PRR vote. Contextual studies 
of PRR vote and immigrant presence have developed the concept of a  ‘halo effect ? to account for the 
phenomenon of higher levels of PRR electoral support neighbouring, but not entering, areas of 
immigrant presence. The first implicit statement of ƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵŽŶĂŶĚŚĞǇůĂŶ ?Ɛ
ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ&EƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐŝƚǇŽĨDĂƌƐĞŝůůĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇŶŽƚĞĚ&EƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ SŶŽƚŝŶ
ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƐƚƌŽŶŐŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƌĞĂƐ ?ďƵƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŵĂƌŐŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P
270-71, authorƐ ?ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?WĞƌƌŝŶĞĂƵŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐůŝǀŝŶŐĐůŽƐĞĞŶŽƵŐŚ
to immigrant populations to be aware of their presence, through sporadic contact, but lacking 
quality contact or information regarding such groups, will be more likely to perceive these latter as a 
greater threat and therefore vote for the radical right, and that such an effect may continue to 
operate in areas which are further away from areas with high concentration of immigrants (1998: 
148) 
Such accounts of socio-spatial redistribution and their political impact implicitly invoke and combine 
theories of ethnic prejudice as an explanatory mechanism. In areas of high immigrant presence, the 
existence of interaction and significant, high-quality contact between groups should reduce negative 
attitudes towards immigrants, and posterior to this, support for the radical right. In the ethnically 
more homogeneous periphery, on the other hand, perception of neighbouring immigrant presence, 
but without high-quality contact which would diminish feelings of competition, should produce 
instead increased levels of prejudice conducive to PRR support. Beyond that periphery, the distance 
reduces immigrant contact to the extent that there is a null effect on prejudice and PRR support. 
Consequently, the functional form of the halo effect on PRR support is expected to be curvilinear, 
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peaking at intermediate distance, peripheral areas, and declining again beyond those zones, other 
things being equal. 
In terms of the French FN vote, this halo has never been tested robustly, however. Beyond 
cartographical mapping of FN vote and immigrant population, the issue has generally been 
addressed indirectly, by considering the level of urbanisation, identifying growing support for the 
party as the distance from the main urban centres increases (Bussi et al, 2012). Outside France, a 
small number of ecological studies have attempted to unpick empirically the halo effect beyond a 
descriptive analysis of relative proportions of PRR vote and immigrant population. Bowyer (2008) 
examined the link between ethnic composition and British National Party vote in the 2002 and 2003 
local elections, using ecological data to identify a diverging contextual effect across two spatial levels 
 W increased PRR support in local authority areas with higher ethnic diversity, consistent with ethnic 
threat, but lower support in electoral wards with high ethnic diversity, consistent with contact 
theory. These two opposing dynamics would support the halo effect hypothesis. In Sweden, Rydgren 
and Ruth (2013) explicitly test for the presence of a halo effect across national electoral districts, and 
find evidence that those districts with lower immigrant populations situated next to districts with 
high concentrations have the highest propensity to support the Sweden Democrats. Using aggregate 
data at the level of Swiss municipalities, Martig and Bernauer (2018) find evidence of both direct 
negative effects of minority populations on the share of the SVP, and of halo effects.  
Within these accounts of the halo, there are two clear omissions. First, from a spatial perspective, 
there is no specification of the distance from the centre of an immigrant population to the borders 
of the area affected by the halo. In its original formulation, the halo is a qualitative construct, 
applied to both sub-communal (within-city) and inter-communal (across-city) levels, rendering 
definitions of those areas which are peripheral or central largely subjective. Second, for most of 
them, tests of such halo have remained at the ecological level, thereby only testing by implication a 
consistent link between individual behaviour and social context within aggregate measures, let alone 
demonstrating an attitudinal mechanism. 
Only a few studies have looked explicitly at the individual level. In the US, using field experiments 
and small-scale interactions, Enos (2017) identifies the interaction between size of community, 
distance between ethnic populations and levels of segregation in the effect on intercommunal 
relations and perceptions of the other. In Germany, Klinger et al (2017) use geocoded data from the 
2014 ALLBUS General Social Survey to look for a halo effect at the individual level, but find no 
evidence of this. The multilevel path analysis by Green et al. (2016) suggests a positive association 
between the presence of immigrants and individual PRR voting in Switzerland, indirectly through 
threat perceptions. In Belgium, David et al. (2018), while not specifically testing a halo effect, use 
geolocalised voter data and find that the presence of immigrants has a greater impact on attitudes 
towards immigration and extreme right voting in the surrounding areas than within the immediate 
vicinity of voter residence. 
 
A French empirical ĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŚĂůŽ ? 
In this article, we suggest a possible spatial operationalization of the halo effect which we test on the 
Front National (FN)1 vote and attitudes in France. The FN is generally considered a typical instance of 
the West European PRR (Mudde 2007) and the perceived importance of immigration is underlined 
                                                          
1 The party was renamed Rassemblement national in June 2018. To avoid ambiguity, we use its former label 
which has been used in the literature to date, and was correct for the time-period of the analysis. 
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by the vast literature dedicated to the party (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992, 1996; Lewis-Beck and 
Mitchell, 1993; Mayer, 2002; Crépon et al, 2015, Edo et al. 2019). Anti-immigration attitudes 
represent a distinct individual predictor for FN vote over time (Perrineau, 1998; Mayer, 2013, 2017). 
Using data from the  ‘^Ƶď-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂŶĚƌĂĚŝĐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?^ŽZ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐƵƌǀĞǇ
collected after the 2017 presidential elections in France which included sub-communal geocoding of 
its respondents (see Appendix A1 for data information), we test a series of multilevel models to look 
at the halo effect on FN vote both directly and mediated by immigration attitudes. Using a multilevel 
model with high spatial resolution allows us to answer important questions linked to immigrant 
presence, ethnic prejudice and the FN vote, as well as testing more broadly for a halo effect at the 
individual level, thus surmounting some of the traditional hurdles of contextual analysis of 
immigration effects. 
First, the design allows us to test the effect of distance from areas of high immigrant presence  W the 
operating term we use to designate the spatial centres of the halo effect  W whilst controlling for 
other individual and contextual effects. Attitudes concerning ethno-cultural diversity, which are core 
ƚŽWZZǀŽƚĞ ?ĂƌĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĐƵůƚ ƌĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƐŽĐŝŽ-economic 
position (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), and it is therefore crucial to control for such individual 
characteristics. Second, the design of the survey allows us to look at the contextual effects of 
immigrant presence at different scales, and how these operate independently  W if indeed they do  W 
of the halo, along with other important socio-economic drivers of the FN vote, including level of 
urbanisation and unemployment. Standard models of PRR vote would lead us to expect, ecologically, 
a positive association between vote for these parties and immigrant levels. However, the halo effect 
predicts a negative association in the local area, positive association at increasing distances, and a 
null or negative effect at the greatest distances. This then allows us to understand if there also exists 
an independent effect, proxying for media effects or other behavioural drivers, of immigration 
beyond the halo. Additionally, we look at contextual effects of education and local socio-economic 
conditions. This follows recent research such as Van Wijk et al. (2019), which demonstrates that 
support for the PRR tends to be much lower in areas with higher shares of highly educated residents. 
The recent study by Hoxhaj and Zuccotti shows that the relationship between attitudes towards 
immigration and presence of immigrants is conditioned by the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the area of residence, and that  Sthe positive relationship between immigrant concentration 
and (positive) attitudes decreases as the socioeconomic condition of areas worsens  ? (2020: 16). 
Finally, and most notably, our research design allows us to look for evidence of the halo effect on 
attitudes as well as voting behaviour. Recent studies have underlined the importance of perceptions 
of individuals in the understanding of the ethnic make-up of their environment (Laméris et al 2018; 
Laurence et al. 2019). In line with this research, we test one important foundational assumption of 
the halo that the contextual effects of immigrant presence on support for the FN are mediated by 
immigration attitudes, in particular voter perception of both symbolic and instrumental ethnic 
threats.  
 
Data and method 
The SCoRE survey provided a nationally representative sample of 19,454 respondents who had 
agreed to geocoding of their location, recorded at street level, to allow matching on contextual 
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socio-economic and demographic data at the neighbourhood (IRIS)2 level. IRIS are statistically 
aggregated areas of c. 2,000 inhabitants produced by the French national statistical and economic 
agency (INSEE) which provide a cluster of individuals spatially arrayed in an approximation of a 
quartier (neighbourhood). There are a total of 50,153 IRIS in metropolitan France, which are nested 
in 36,529 communes (municipalities) themselves nested in 96 départements. We do not include 
communes because these vary substantially in size, from tiny rural communes with fewer than 100 
inhabitants, to the largest metropolitan cities such as Paris. The voter geocoding allows the 
calculation of the straight-line distance of respondents from areas of high immigrant population, 
using street-level location for the former and ƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ/Z/^ ?Ɛ geographic centroid for the latter. 
The main models use first-round vote for Marine Le Pen in the 2017 presidential election as the 
dependent variable, measured as a binary variable between Le Pen vote and votes for all other 
candidates, and therefore employing a logit function. To avoid possible compositional effects linked 
to respondents in the survey who themselves are immigrants, we take out any who were not born in 
France. Studies show that perceived ethnic threat is generally more salient among majority 
populations (Oliver and Wong 2013), so it is important that we control for immigrant background. As 
an additional check, we also run models excluding respondents with at least one foreign-born 
parent, to eliminate further second-generation effects (Appendix A6). As we are primarily interested 
in vote choice, we also remove non-responses, those who abstained, or cast blank or spoiled ballots. 
Together with missing values across the set of predictor variables, the main unweighted analytical 
sample is 12,414. A comparison of the full sample and analytical sample on outcome and predictor 
variables revealed no evidence of bias through this loss of cases (Appendix A1, Table 1). 
Areas of high immigrant presence were identified at the IRIS level using the proportion of 
immigrants on the total population. We use immigrant  W which includes French of foreign origin  W
rather than foreign measures as this reflects the implied ethnic diversity relevant to PRR vote.  Let us 
recall here that the French census does not collect ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶŽƌ
ethnicity. Objective measures based on the countries of birth of the respondent and their 
antecedents cannot take into account later-generation descendants of immigrants (Simon 2010). 
While this limitation should be noted, recent research suggests nonetheless that second-generation 
immigrant residential mobility is generally low in France, showing persistent patterns of ethnic 
clustering (McAvay 2018), whereby shares of first-generation immigrants may more generally be 
seen as a good proxy for ethnic diversity across local areas. 
In order to identify areas that are the most ethnically diverse, we tag those IRIS with large immigrant 
population. Previous research into ethnic threat and anti-immigrant prejudice (Quillian, 1995; 
Schneider, 2008) tends to use continuous predictors such as proportion of immigrant population, 
rather than identifying a cut-off for group size. Biggs and Knauss find on the other hand that contact 
operates only in local areas where the minority proportion exceeds a certain threshold (one-tenth to 
one-quarter) (2012: 642). Recent studies such as Savelkoul et al. (2017) also suggest that the effect 
of neighbourhood ethnic composition on voting for the radical right may be conditional on the size 
of the immigrant population, identifying an empirical threshold of 15 per cent of the total 
neighbourhood population. In their analysis of residential mobility, Lancee and Schaeffer (2015) use 
an arbitrary cut point, defining the 15% most diverse neighbourhoods in Germany as high-diversity 
                                                          
2 Ilots Regroupés pour l'Information Statistique (IRIS), 
https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/definition/c1523. We used the 2015 geography (COG2015) which was 
the latest available for socio-demographic data. 
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areas, while taking diversity levels below the median (50%) to reflect more homogeneous 
neighbourhoods. 
In this paper, areas with a strong immigrant presence are identified from all 50,153 IRIS in 
metropolitan France, as those with an immigrant population one standard deviation higher than the 
national average. As with most cut-offs, this is an ad hoc decision  W in practice, meaning an 
immigrant population proportion of just under 17.5%. A test of a range of other cut-offs found that 
this provided the best model fit amongst different specifications (Appendix A2, Figure 1 and Table 1). 
Following Lancee and Schaeffer, we use the nationwide average for our calculations, bearing in mind 
that there are large disparities in immigrant populations across regions, in particular the Île-de-
France i.e. Paris and its region, where immigrants represent over 18% of the total population, as 
against 9% for the rest of the country. As will be discussed below, our models include higher-level 
controls of immigrant presence for départements, which help account for regional variance as well 
as for the Île-de-France idiosyncrasy. In total, 4,089 areas of high immigration were identified in 
mainland France, including Corsica, at the IRIS level, representing just over 8% of the total number of 
IRIS. For each respondent in the survey, the straight-line distance between the nearest area and 
their location was measured using the street-level geocoded location of the respondent and the 
centroid of this nearest area of high immigrant presence. 
The expectation from the halo effect is that, as this distance initially increases, the probability of 
voting for Le Pen increases, then drops away as the distance increases further. We test this first in an 
individual level model, including random IRIS and département intercepts to allow comparison with 
subsequent models, to check that a basic halo effect is visible in a naïve specification. Distance is 
measured in kilometres, included as a main term and a quadratic term, to pick up non-linearity, and 
is reported in the model by 10km increments, to allow visibility of the quadratic term parameter 
estimates at lower decimal places. We include three demographic controls  W gender, coded for 
women; age (continuous coding, including a quadratic term to test for possible curvilinearity) and 
level of education, recoded into four categories  W lower and no education, intermediate, secondary, 
and tertiary (the reference). These three controls are standard demographic predictors of PRR vote 
in France (Mayer 2013). Additionally, the PRR literature suggests that feelings of deprivation rather 
than actual objective economic conditions are stronger predictors of voting for those parties (eg. 
Mughan et al. 2003, Im et al. 2019) and we therefore include a measure of subjective deprivation  W a 
four-point measure ranging from low deprivation ( ‘ŽƵƌŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚŝƐǁĞůůŽĨĨ ? ?ƚŽŚŝŐŚĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ
 ? ‘ŽƵƌŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƌĞĂůůǇĐĂŶŶŽƚŐĞƚďǇ ? ? ? 
Given the importance of the periurban / rural geographical account of FN support, it is important to 
control for this as a competing explanation to the halo: immigrants in France tend to cluster in urban 
centres and suburban areas (banlieues), much less in the more distant outskirts and rural areas.3 We 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂĚƵŵŵǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐĨŽƌƵƌďĂŶǀƉĞƌŝƵƌďĂŶ ?ƌƵƌĂůƉƌŽĨŝůĞŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?
locations, derived from the INSEE zoning, and grouping metropolitan, suburban and so-called 
 ‘ŵƵůƚŝƉŽůĂƌ ?ĂƌĞĂƐ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽŵĞĚŝƵŵ-sized and small towns together with rural communes.4 
Secondly, we bring context in and test a multi-level logit model of Le Pen vote on the previous Level 
1 variables, as well as fixed contextual Level 2 IRIS variables, and Level 3 département variables, with 
random intercepts. As indicated earlier, Level 2 nests hierarchically within Level 3. This model 
incorporates immigrant population and proportion of unemployed at both Level 2 and Level 3, as 
                                                          
3  ‘>ĂůŽĐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŐĠŽŐƌĂƉŚŝƋƵĞĚĞƐŝŵŵŝŐƌĠƐ ? ?https://insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2121524 
4  ‘>ĞŶŽƵǀĞĂƵǌŽŶĂŐĞĞŶĂŝƌĞƐƵƌďĂŝŶĞƐĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1281191 
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measured by the 2015 census.5 We also add the share of residents with a university degree in the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŽŵĞ/Z/^ ?This allows us to control for possible contextual effects which have been 
linked in the previous literature to radical right support, such as unemployment (Sipma and Lubbers 
2018) and education (Van Wijk et al. 2019). More specifically, it also allows us to check if  W in 
addition to the halo effect  W there is evidence of independent contextual effects from immigration. 
As a next step, we include a set of attitudinal predictors following standard accounts of FN support 
in France to test for evidence of the halo mechanism. We include measures of cultural threat 
 ? S&ƌĞŶĐŚĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐƚhreatened or enriched by immigration [seven-point Likert scale] ? ?economic 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ? SŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐĂƌĞŐŽŽĚŽr bad for the French economy [seven-point scale] ? ?authoritarianism 
 ? SƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŶĞĞĚƐĂŐŽŽĚĚŽƐĞŽĨůĂǁĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌ ? [seven-point scale]); ƵƌŽƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? SŚĂƐ
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞhďĞĞŶĂŐŽŽĚ, neutral, ŽƌďĂĚƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? [three-point scale]); populism 
 ? SƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŶŽƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?[five-point 
scale]); ŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ ? SƐĂŵĞ-sex marriage should be equal in the eyes of the law to marriage 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƐĞǆ ? [seven-point scale]), ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? Sthe 
government should take steps to reduce economic inequality ? [seven-point scale]). All attitudes are 
coded to associate positively with Le Pen vote, and in the full model, we expect all of them to be 
significant. 
Fourth, we explore the possible role of intergroup contact in the model and ask to what extent this 
covaries with halo distance. Let us note here that the set of necessary conditions are not available in 
the survey to fully test contact. We must consider possible endogeneity with attitudes and therefore 
restrict this to a conservative control to test against the halo hypothesis. Simply put, are we in fact 
picking up the effect of contact with ethnic minorities through the use of a spuriously inflected test 
of neighbouring perceptions? We use an item asking respondents to estimate the frequency of 
contact with people of a different ethnic origin, raŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŽ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?, coded by 
predominant time period (day, week, month). We expect that greater frequency of contact would be 
associated with lower ethnic prejudice and consequently a direct effect on Le Pen vote, however not 
affecting the halo.6 We then suggest a more complex specification to test the independent and 
conditioned effect of intergroup contact on the halo, by addressing both quantity and quality of 
contact. 
Next, we look at the role of attitudes as mediators of the contextual effects of immigrant presence 
on support for the FN. To that end, we use a structural equation model, with paths from halo to each 
of the attitude items, as depicted in Figure 4 in the next section. The model specifies a set of random 
intercept models to the mediating attitudes, all with a Gaussian identity family/link function, with 
the direct attitudinal effects leading to the dependent vote variable, under Bernouilli logit  W identical 
to the parameter estimates from the full model. Because of the inclusion of both metric and binary 
outcomes, we use a generalised structural equation model (GSEM), fitted using the gsem package in 
Stata. If the halo effect influences individual perceptions of immigrants, and therefore alters political 
behaviour, we would expect attitudes related to immigrants to mediate the halo effect on vote, but 
attitudes unrelated to the halo  W but still related to Le Pen support  W not to include this indirect 
effect. Given research into the effect of perceived threat on ethnic prejudice and authoritarianism 
                                                          
5 We also tested the inclusion of the Level 2 IRIS immigrant measure with a quadratic term, to provide an 
additional test for composition  W lower support for Le Pen in areas of very high and very low immigrant 
presence; higher support in other areas. However, no statistically significant effect was found. 
6 >ĞƚƵƐŶŽƚĞŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚŽƵƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĚĞŶŽƚĞ ‘ĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞŽƵƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂů
ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƵƐĞƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?ĂƐĂƉƌŽǆǇĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?dŚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƐƵďũĞĐƚŝƐĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ
different measures in survey and ceŶƐƵƐĚĂƚĂ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝ ƚŚĞĐĞŶƐƵƐ ? 
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(Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Feldman, 2003; Cohrs and Ibler, 2009), we would expect related 
attitudes, such as the need for law and order, to be affected similarly to the cultural and economic 
threat variables (Koslowski, 2012), as should also be the case for Euroscepticism which is 
conceptually linked to migration, free movement of labour and Schengen (Gajewska, 2006). 
However, we would expect small or no effects on irrelevant attitudes such as economic 
interventionism and moral conservatism. 
As a final step, we carry out a series of robustness checks. For robustness checks where null findings, 
or findings in line with our main specifications, are found, we include information on these in the 
Appendix. First, we check for the quality of fit of the quadratic distance terms to pick up the halo 
effect. We apply a fractional polynomial transformation (Royston and Sauerbrei, 2008) to identify 
the best fitting curve from the distance effect. Second, we replace the vote variable with a 
propensity to vote (PtV) measure, to check that the model is not inadvertently confounding party 
support effects with personality effects for Marine Le Pen. Similarly, we test the halo using the 
second-round runoff of the 2017 presidential, where Le Pen increased her first-round support from 
21.3 to 33.9 per cent of the vote. All three alternative specifications are reported in Appendix A3. 
As regards immigration, we test our model for compositional effects associated with second-
generation immigrants in our survey (Appendix A6). At contextual level, we use an alternative 
dataset at a higher level of aggregation to control more specifically for the presence of non-
European immigrants (Appendix A7). While the PRR may target immigration from Eastern European 
countries, the nativism of those parties is most consistently directed at non-European immigrants 
(Mudde 2007: 70). Therefore, ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƚĞƐƚŽƵƌŵŽĚĞůĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨ ‘ŶŽŶ-wŚŝƚĞ ?
immigration across local areas. We discuss the data limitations of this test in the supporting 
Appendix. Lastly, we move to two competing theories of the halo. First, following literature 
emphasizing the central role of ethnic change rather than static proportions in anti-immigration 
attitudes and the PRR vote (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018), we control for increase in ethnic 
diversity over time (Appendix A8). Second, we try to look at the effect of ethnic segregation in the 
area of residence. Here, we follow ecological studies such as Biggs and Knauss (2012), which show 
that PRR support increases with residential segregation between whites and non-whites, rather than 
with the actual proportion of non-whites. Again here, the methods and limitations from available 
data are explained in Appendix A9. 
 
Findings 
We start with an illustrative example of a possible halo effect at the ecological level. The map shows 
the geographic distribution of the 2017 first-round Le Pen vote in communes (vote share not being 
available by IRIS) surrounding the town of Montauban in the Tarn-et-Garonne département in the 
South-West of France (Figure 1). The stars identify areas of high immigrant presence, at the IRIS 
level. These two areas  W the Coulée Verte district of Montauban and the town centre of Moissac  W 
have particularly high proportions of immigrant population, with 33.9% and 29.6% of the total 
population, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.  Example of halo distance ʹ 5km concentric circles around areas of High Immigrant 
Population mapped on PRR vote, French presidential elections, 1st round 
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Following previous descriptive accounts of the halo effect, the map shows the negative association 
between immigrant presence and FN vote  W ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐǁŚĞƌĞDĂƌŝŶĞ>ĞWĞŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝƐŚŝŐŚĞƐƚůŝĞ
outside the immediate vicinity of the immigrant loci. The concentric circles, positioned at 5km 
increments, indicate that communes between 5 and 20km from the immigrant loci are where the FN 
candidate performs best electorally. As distance increases further, however, support tends to drop 
off. Such a dynamic would correspond to what the halo effect predicts. 
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Table 1. Multi-level logit models of halo effect for (a) baseline demographic; (b) contextual; (c) 
education, and (d) full model specifications 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017 1 - base 2 - context 3 - education 4 - full 
     
Female -0.029 -0.026 -0.034 -0.058 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.070) 
Age 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.028 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education - secondary  0.899*** 0.902*** 0.870*** 0.596*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.094) 
Education  W intermediate 1.364*** 1.371*** 1.329*** 0.814*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.098) 
Education - technical / none 1.466*** 1.474*** 1.423*** 0.918*** 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.128) 
Subjective deprivation 0.440*** 0.436*** 0.425*** 0.076 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.046) 
Distance (10kms) 0.422*** 0.396*** 0.268*** 0.294** 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.078) (0.099) 
Distance2 (10kms)  -0.078*** -0.066*** -0.045** -0.044* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) 
Urban -0.014 -0.013 0.078 0.157 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.091) 
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2)  -0.014* -0.020** -0.013 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2)  0.007 -0.006 -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3)  0.152*** 0.167*** 0.145*** 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) 
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3)  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployed % dép. (Level 3)  0.084*** 0.079*** 0.059** 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) 
University educated % IRIS (Level 2)   -0.026*** -0.019*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Cultural threat    0.332*** 
    (0.026) 
Economic threat    0.301*** 
    (0.026) 
Law and order    0.275*** 
    (0.024) 
Same-sex marriage    0.054*** 
    (0.016) 
Govt. reduces inequality    0.029 
    (0.024) 
Populism    0.211*** 
    (0.037) 
Euroscepticism    1.192*** 
    (0.063) 
Constant -4.295*** -6.137*** -5.288*** -8.673*** 
 (0.305) (0.428) (0.431) (0.612) 
     
DéparteŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.118*** 0.052** 0.034* 0.021 
 (0.030) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
     
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.690*** 0.691*** 0.670*** 0.902*** 
 (0.167) (0.166) (0.165) (0.254) 
AIC 11292.278 11257.770 11224.959 7571.814 
Observations  W all models Level 1: 12414; Level 2: 9484; Level 3: 96 
     
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Do we find evidence of this aggregate-level, descriptive association in individual behaviour? The 
baseline model (Table 1, 1  W base) including just individual level indicators conforms largely to 
expectations. Demographic predictors follow the pattern found in other research into the first-round 
vote for Marine Le Pen, namely an absence of the gender gap historically found in PRR vote 
(Amengay et al, 2017) and a lower probability of Le Pen vote amongst the more highly educated 
(Ivarsflaten and Stubager, 2013). A quadratic effect can be observed for age, with a significant 
increase in support for Le Pen amongst younger voters and a decrease in the older age bands, which 
is line with previous literature such as Arzheimer (2009). Feelings of economic deprivation have a 
significant and positive effect, increasing the probability to vote Le Pen. Furthermore, the distance 
effect conforms to the halo hypothesis, with a positive linear term and negative quadratic. 
Model 2 (2  W context) depicts the multi-level model including immigrant and unemployment 
measures at Level 2 (IRIS) and Level 3 (département). There remains significant variance between 
départements and between IRIS which is not explained by the fixed part of the model. Looking at the 
fixed effects at Level 1, the same effects as in the baseline individual model are present. There is no 
significant effect for urbanisation. Looking at Level 3, the model confirms the presence of macro 
effects linked to unemployment, positively associated at departmental level with Le Pen vote, 
suggesting that feelings of deprivation may be compounded in the case of areas of economic 
hardship in which they are nested. Unemployment at Level 2 does not reach significance, however 
this is in part due to covariance with the Level 1 deprivation measure, removal of which sees a 
positive coefficient, significant at the 95% level, for the IRIS unemployment rate. This follows a stable 
finding from previous research into ecological predictors of Le Pen / FN vote (Arzheimer and Evans, 
2010; Evans and Ivaldi, 2012), and it is in line with research showing a recent consolidation of the FN 
vote among the most precarious and vulnerable sectors of the electorate (Mayer, 2017).  We also 
find that the Level 2 and Level 3 immigration effect mirrors that found by Rojon (2013) and della 
Posta (2013)  W a negative coefficient at the IRIS level, but a positive coefficient at the departmental 
level. This is nonetheless inflected by a negative quadratic term, reflecting the lower probability of 
Le Pen vote in departments with the highest levels of immigrants. Local conditions see higher 
immigrant presence reducing PRR support, as predicted by contact theory, but higher levels in less 
local parts of the surrounding higher spatial unit motivating PRR support. Running the contextual 
model without the distance terms for the halo increases the model AIC from 11257.77 to 11283.66: 
added complexity from including the halo effect increases its explanatory power. 
 
Figure 2.  Fitted probability of halo effect across model specifications (cf Table 1) with 95% 
confidence intervals  
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For a more concrete sense of the halo effect, the curvilinear effect is plotted in Figure 2 as a fitted 
probability, using average fitted values based on average marginal effects (AMEs).7 The distribution 
of distances to high immigrant area across respondents is underlayed as a histogram. At initial 
increases in distance from nearest area of high immigrant presence, the probability of a Le Pen vote 
increases, until around 20 km where the curve flattens and 95% confidence intervals begin to 
overlap significantly. Beyond 30-35km, the curve drops, with widening confidence intervals as the 
number of observations drops for individuals living a relatively large distance from an area of high 
immigration. These findings first confirm the radius to the halo effect of immigration on PRR vote 
within commuting or retail range in areas where voters are most likely to interact with immigrants 
daily, in line with the general premises of the halo. 
In model 3 (3  W education), we test the halo distance against the added contextual effect of 
proportion of university education. In line with previous research (Van Wijk et al. 2019), we find a 
strong negative association between support for Le Pen and shares of university degree holders in 
the local area, which corroborates that support for the PRR tends to be much lower in areas with 
higher shares of highly educated residents. This does reduce the coefficient size of the distance 
effect, and the range of the probability differential in Le Pen vote (Figure 2, model 3). Nonetheless, 
these remain significant, which suggests that there is a halo effect independent of education levels 
in the home IRIS. 
In model 4 (4  W full), we introduce the seven attitudinal predictors, tapping economic and cultural 
threat, authoritarianism, Euroscepticism, populism, moral conservatism and economic 
interventionism. Here, inter-département variance is accounted for, but there remains significant 
variance between IRISs within départements. At this stage we do not look at the relative impact of 
ĞĂĐŚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚŝŶĂůǀĂƌŝĂďůĞŽŶƚŚĞŚĂůŽ ?ƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?The key expectation here is that the halo 
                                                          
7 All plots use the plotplain Stata scheme (Bischof, 2017). 
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effect should wash out, if the attitudes entirely mediate its effect on vote. This is clearly not the 
case. In all but one case  W government reduction of inequality  W the attitudes go in the expected PRR 
direction, with positive and significant coefficients. However, the halo effect remains stable, 
suggesting either that the halo may also act as a proxy for other contextual effects of the FN vote 
which may not necessarily be mediated by PRR attitudes, or that there are further mediators 
(analysed below) which are not specified in our model. 
As a final step, we introduce the concept of contact into the modelling, based upon respondentƐ ?
stated frequency of contact with different ethnicities. The models so far have implied contact levels 
from the distance measure. We cannot test contact robustly, given its possible endogeneity with the 
attitudinal items. Here we simply wish to ascertain if, first, there is a clear contact effect, and 
second, whether this covaries strongly with the halo. To explore this further, following Voci and 
Hewstone (2003), we introduce the notion of quality of contact as an additional and independent 
dimension to quantity of contact with different minorities. We then look at a more complex 
specification of inter-ethnic contact, to check if there is any impact on the distance variable 
(Appendix A4, Table 1). To what extent is PRR vote motivated by the independent, and multiplicative 
effects of these two aspects to contact? Again, the test is not robust to endogeneity, and we 
therefore remove the attitudinal variables to avoid issues of collinearity. We include simplified 
versions of the quality and quantity contact variables (see details in Appendix A4). We also include 
an interaction term, with the expectation that frequent negative contact will operate differentially 
on PRR vote than frequent positive contact. Alongside this test, we run a separate model including 
those respondents reporting no contact (and therefore with no quality measure). Here we interact 
this variable with the halo itself, to understand further the inter-relationship, if any, between the 
halo and contact. Full models are reported in Appendix A4, for reasons of space; Figure 3 reports the 
key findings through the predicted probabilities from these models.  
 
Figure 3. Measures of (a) ethnic minority contact (quantity and quality), (b) and (c) distance 
measure, and predicted probabilities of Le Pen vote with 95% confidence intervals 
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The findings in panel (a) of Figure 3 are in line with the expectations of the halo, namely that the 
average reduction in support for the radical right through greater contact is only true of those with a 
broadly positive stated experience, while those who view such contact as negative are in fact more 
likely to vote Le Pen at higher levels of frequency of self-reported intergroup contact. Panels (b) and 
(c) map the conditional effect of contact quantity across the halo. As would again be anticipated 
from theory, the curvilinear effect of halo is most visible for respondents who report the most 
frequent contacts with immigrants, showing a significant increase in radical right support for those in 
the peripheries surrounding areas of strong immigrant presence. Less expected is the greater 
differentiation among the monthly and greater than monthly group, with a similar curve to the daily 
group, contrasting with the absence of an effect for the weekly group. We do not have an 
explanation for this contrast. Also of note is the high level of support for Le Pen among those 
reporting no contact living within the halo effect radius. While the size of the CIs suggests greater 
heterogeneity, this is suggestive of segregation, with no contact despite relative proximity of ethnic 
groups, which we explore under the robustness test section following. While the nature of our 
measure of contact does not allow to examine this further, these findings confirm the crucial role of 
intergroup contact in the structuration of immigration attitudes and voting for the radical right, 
however differently operating along the halo distance. 
Finally, we use the GSEM (Appendix A5, Table 1) to look at the mediation model, to understand 
which, if any, of the seven attitudinal predictors mediate the halo effect. Theoretically, we would 
expect only those attitudes linked to migrant threat to be substantially affected by the halo. Those 
variables linked to PRR support in France that are less connected, or unconnected to immigration, 
should see weaker or null effects. The indirect paths from halo distance to attitudes are presented in 
Figure 4. (For clarity, we omit the direct effect of distance, the quadratic distance term, and the 
socio-demographic and higher level terms, which are specified as in model 2.) The mediation paths 
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generally correspond to expectations. Both economic and cultural threat of migrants are strongly 
determined by the halo effect. As anticipated, there is a weaker but significant effect for law and 
order, Euroscepticism and populism.8 Conversely, there is no significant effect on moral 
conservatism and economic interventionism, with both effects independent of halo. 
 
Figure 4.  Mediation model of halo distance on attitudes 
 
Note: distance2  omitted for clarity  W follows significance of linear term. Direct distance effect, demographic 
controls and Level 2/3 fixed effects also omitted. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
This confirms the role of attitudes mediating between halo and the PRR vote. However, there 
remains the independent effect of the halo distance to account for. A series of additional predictors 
were tested, to address possible under-specification, both at the ecological and individual levels. 
There was no evidence of contextual or compositional effects from the socio-economic profile of 
IRIS, beyond unemployment, education and immigration. At the individual level, the greatest 
reduction in the halo effect  W but still only partial  W came from the inclusion of FN party identification 
(itself strongly determined by the halo). This suggests that, in addition to the attitudinal effects of 
the halo, there may also be an identity effect in those communities adjacent to areas with high 
presence of immigrants, as well as additional mediators unanticipated by our specification. 
 
Robustness tests 
Lastly, we move to our robustness tests. Full models and specifications for each of these tests can be 
found in the supplementary appendix. With regard first to the quadratic distance term, a fractional 
polynomial regression (Royston and Sauerbrei, 2008; Royston, 2013) using the baseline model for 
                                                          
8 With regard to the populist item, we would simply note that this item, along with all the others, except 
economic inequality, link to the latent dimension of authoritarianism, and we might therefore expect some 
small shift through attitudinal constraint (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). 
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simplicity, confirms that this is the best-fitting approximation of the ŚĂůŽ ?Ɛdistance effect on Le Pen 
vote (Appendix A3, Figure 1 and Table 1). Second, we test the baseline model, but control for 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ>ĞWĞŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĞĨĨĞĐƚƐďǇƵƐŝŶŐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĞůĨ-assessed propensity to vote (PtV) for 
the FN. The same curvilinear fit is visible. The respective dependent variable scales are not directly 
comparable, but there is no evidence that any confounding personality effects are biasing findings in 
the first-round presidential vote model. Furthermore, in the more fully specified models, including 
the mediation model, the independent effects of the individual and contextual predictors are very 
similar to the presidential model. Third, we run our model using the second-round runoff of the 
2017 presidential, and find no significant change to the halo, suggesting an attitudinal effect on 
voters beyond simple PRR political affiliation. 
Looking at immigration variables, we test further for compositional effects and run the model 
excluding second-generation immigrants, that is, respondents with at least one foreign-born parent, 
and find no substantive change to the halo (Appendix A6). We then address the composition of 
immigrant populations, delineating between the presence of European and non-European 
immigrants at contextual level, and find no significant change to our distance effect according to 
shares of European and non-European immigration across local areas (Appendix A7). Finally, we 
assess two competing theories of the halo. We look at a dynamic measure of change in ethnic 
diversity over time, rather than our main static measures, but find no significant effect, and no 
change to the halo (Appendix A8). Looking at the effect of ethnic segregation at the local level, 
within the bounds of what available data permit, similarly shows no significant change to the halo 
effect (Appendix A9). Overall, the halo effect in France is robust to complementary and competing 
specifications of drivers of PRR vote. 
 
Discussion 
This article has provided the first robust test of the existence of a halo effect at the individual level  in 
France, controlling for contextual determinants of PRR vote, and exploring the attitudinal 
mechanism by which such an effect should work. Our findings show a significant curvilinear halo 
effect at the individual level, amongst voters living around and at further distance of areas with 
significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations. This effect is robust to different model 
specifications and independent of the general socio-economic context in which voters live, as well as 
socio-demographic voter attributes. 
The use of the distance measure to an area of high immigrant presence defined by migrant 
threshold allows the estimation of scale  W that is, the distance between community and migrant 
population which reflects the tenets of the contact and competition theories, while addressing some 
issues associated with assessing the relationship between immigrant presence and PRR voting at 
different scales of measurement i.e. local versus departmental. As surmised in these theories, areas 
with direct, daily contact with dense migrant communities are not the areas where individuals will 
be more predisposed to vote for a PRR candidate such as Marine Le Pen  W and, given the nature of 
our test, this is not a compositional artefact. Nor is there a consistent pattern of PRR support in 
areas far from areas of high immigrant presence, where contact with migrant populations of those 
specific zones is likely to be minimal, but where more diffuse migrant populations may or may not be 
present. 
Our findings confirm and expand on the older French literature on the halo effect which posited an 
extensive radius to the migrant effect on PRR vote, emphasizing important aspects of the political 
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geography of intergroup contact, and how perceptions of immigration may be shaped by where 
voters live and interact with immigrants daily. As the distances in our halo suggest, only in areas 
corresponding to zones within travelling distance of an area of high immigration, for commuting or 
retail reasons, for example, do we find a significant increase in the likelihood of PRR vote. 
Most importantly, this paper confirms the presence of individual attitudinal drivers from the halo on 
voting for the radical right. Building on previous work on contextual effects of immigrant presence at 
the aggregate level, the path analysis in this paper helps underline some of the attitudinal 
mechanisms through which contextual factors act to shape subjective experiences of immigration, 
and how these are reflected in voting for the PRR. 
There are some limitations to this research, however. First, our test does temper any over-statement 
of the halo effect. Whilst there is a statistically significant, non-linear effect, the change in vote 
probability for Le Pen is moderate, pointing to the role of the halo as conditioning effect rather than 
principal driver of PRR vote. Second is the articulation between halo and intergroup contact. While 
the link between the two can be established conceptually, our research design has not permitted to 
explore further the role of contact, beyond checking the robustness of the halo effect to its 
inclusion. ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŚĂƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞŵƵůĂƚĞ ‘ƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?
interactions (Dixon et al. 2005). Given our contact measurement in this paper, we cannot be sure of 
the relative non-recursive effects with attitudes  W how perceptions of migrants condition perception 
of contact  W so this finding requires further confirmation. 
Finally, whilst the link between halo, attitudes and vote is evident, the mechanisms leading to these 
attitudinal positions needs to be understood. Previous research has shown that choice of residential 
location can be partly driven by political attitudes (e.g. Hui, 2013). Our data being cross-sectional, we 
cannot say to what extent attitudes have changed in situ, and to what extent individuals with such 
attitudes have co-ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ?dŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ǁŚŝƚĞĨůŝŐŚƚ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐŚŝĨƚŽĨ&EƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
precisely from areas characterised here as areas of high immigrant presence  W in particular, 
ethnically diverse banlieues  W in the 1980s and early 1990s, to the periurban, ethnically more 
homogeneous areas since the early 2000s (Girard and Rivière, 2013; Andrieu and Lévy, 2007; Guilluy, 
2014), would support the latter hypothesis. Without extensive panel data, however, this remains 
impossible to test. Similarly, our research design does not allow to explore further other contextual 
effects that may be reflected in the halo. To some extent, the geography of the halo in this paper 
corresponds with &ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌŝĞƐǁhere FN voters cluster. As the mediation of halo by 
populism suggests, future research should look into feelings of socio-territorial segregation and 
discontent associated with such peripheries. /ŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ǁŚŝƚĞĨůŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ-and-
neighďŽƵƌƐ ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂǀĞŶƵĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚFN attitudes in social context taking 
a social identity perspective on how group membership may prescribe such attitudes. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literature on the 
relationship between immigration and the PRR, helping disentangle contact and threat by providing 
robust empirical evidence of how these mechanisms may interact to shape immigration attitudes 
and the PRR vote across different spatial scales as well as different levels of ethnic diversity. In 
particular, our results shed light on some of the current issues discussed in the growing literature on 
the urban/rural cleavage which increasingly structures the PRR vote in France and Europe, and which 
may be regarded as a second-order manifestation of deeper demographic and cultural divides 
 ?DĂǆǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƵƐ ? ?ŶŽƐ ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽŐƌŽǁ ?ƚŚĞŚĂůŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŬĞǇƚŽ
understanding the ever more complex relationship between growing spatial ethnic polarization, 
attitudes towards ethnic diversity and, eventually, support for the PRR. 
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A1. Data information and sample descriptives 
The SCoRE survey was conducted by BVA from 11 May to 25 June 2017 and it included a 
representative national sample of 19,454 respondents aged 18 years and older. The data were 
collected through quota sampling based on the criteria of gender, age, education, size of area of 
residence, and administrative region, and they included geocoding of all respondents at the 
neighbourhood (IRIS) level i.e. units of about 2,000 inhabitants. The project was funded by the 
Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) as part of the  ‘^Ƶď-national context and radical right 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? (SCoRE) project. 
For more information, see: https://www.score.uni-mainz.de  
 
Table 1. Analytical and full sample descriptives on outcome and predictor variables 
  Analytical sample  Full sample 
  Variable n Mean / 
proportion 
Std. Dev.   n Mean / 
proportion 
Std. Dev. 
         
L1 Le Pen vote, first round 12414 0.20 
  
15868 0.20 
 
 
Female 12414 0.52 
  
19454 0.55 
 
 
Age 12414 49.02 15.70 
 
19454 47.74 15.84 
 
Education - secondary 12414 0.25 
  
19454 0.26 
 
 
Education - intermediate 12414 0.26 
  
19454 0.27 
 
 
Education - technical / 
none 
12414 0.09 
  
19454 0.10 
 
 
Distance (km) 12414 10.35 13.05 
 
18887 10.14 12.94 
 
Urban 12414 0.67 
  
19451 0.66 
 
 
Subjective deprivation 12414 2.16 0.80 
 
19227 2.22 0.82 
 
Cultural threat 12414 4.20 2.11 
 
18745 4.20 2.10 
 
Economic threat 12414 3.83 1.85 
 
18411 3.86 1.85 
 
Law and order 12414 4.85 1.99 
 
18706 4.82 1.98 
 
Same-sex marriage 12414 2.83 2.11 
 
18621 2.90 2.15 
 
Govt. reduces inequality 12414 5.76 1.48 
 
18910 5.78 1.48 
 
Populism 12414 3.97 1.13 
 
18770 4.01 1.12 
  Euroscepticism 12414 -0.41 0.74   18504 -0.39 0.74 
         
L2 University % 9484 21.50 9.74 
 
13031 21.22 9.70 
 
Immigrant % 9484 8.65 7.80 
 
13031 8.76 8.10 
 
Unemployed % 9484 12.99 6.16 
 
13217 13.07 6.36 
         
L3 Immigrant % 96 7.07 4.14 
    
  Unemployed % 96 12.90 2.21         
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A2. Tests of national (n) immigrant proportion cut-offs 
Areas with a strong immigrant presence are taken from all 50,153 IRIS in metropolitan France as 
those with an immigrant population one standard deviation higher than the national average  W that 
is an immigrant population of just under 17.5%. As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 below, a 
test of a range of other cut-offs shows that this provides the best model fit amongst different 
specifications. 
 
Figure 1. Tests of national (n) immigrant proportion cut-ŽĨĨƐ ?ǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚĂŶĚƵŶǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚ ? ?ʍ W  ?ʍ ?
Halo distance effect in context model (2)  W fitted probabilities for unweighted (m) and weighted (z) cut-offs, at 
integer and half (-Ś ?ʍĐƵƚ-offs
 
Table 1. Contextual model fit (AIC) using unweighted (m) and weighted (z) cut-offs, at integer and 
half (-Ś ?ʍĐƵƚ-offs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 n1m_model n1hm_model n2m_model n2hm_model n3m_model 
N 12414 12414 12414 12414 12414 
AIC 11269.1 11259.7 11267.5 11273.1 11275.1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 n1z_model n1hz_model n2z_model n2hz_model n3z_model 
N 12414 12414 12414 12414 12414 
AIC 11257.8 11269.9 11277.7 11280.4 11280.2 
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A3. Baseline, fractional polynomial, propensity to vote and second-round runoff models of 
halo distance effect 
We test alternative specifications of halo distance for robustness. We first apply a fractional 
polynomial transformation (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008) to identify the best fitting curve to check for 
the quality of fit of the quadratic distance terms to pick up the halo effect. Figure 1, model 1 shows 
the distance effect for the original baseline model. Model 2 shows the fractional polynomial fit with 
a power transformation (0.5, 2) which improves upon linear and natural log models. The halo effect 
 ‘ĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƚĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌĂƚĞƚŚĂŶŽƵƌŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐĞĚŵŽĚĞůǆƉĞĐƚƐ ? Second, we replace the first-
round vote variable with a propensity to vote (PtV) measure (Figure 1, model 3) and finally the 
second-round runoff Le Pen vote (Figure 1, model 4). 
 
Figure 1. Alternative specifications of halo distance for robustness, using fractional polynomial 
traŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ? ‘ƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽǀŽƚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ alternative second-round runoff 
dependent variables 
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Table 1. Baseline model; fractional polynomial transformation of distance measure;  ‘ƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƚŽ
ǀŽƚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ second-round runoff dependent variable 
 Baseline Fractional 
polynomial 
PtV 
 
Second-round vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female -0.029 -0.029 -0.187** -0.080 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.069) (0.053) 
     
Age 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.033* 0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
     
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Education - secondary  0.899*** 0.898*** 0.993*** 0.802*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.087) (0.071) 
     
Education - intermediate 1.364*** 1.366*** 1.768*** 1.295*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.090) (0.076) 
     
Education - technical / none 1.466*** 1.465*** 1.869*** 1.360*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.129) (0.102) 
     
Subjective deprivation 0.440*** 0.443*** 0.671*** 0.627*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.038) 
     
Distance (10kms) 0.422***  0.578*** 0.477*** 
 (0.072)  (0.091) (0.070) 
     
Distance2 (10kms)  -0.078***  -0.105*** -0.088*** 
 (0.015)  (0.019) (0.015) 
     
Urban -0.014 0.016 -0.184* -0.107 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.091) (0.068) 
     
FP term 1 Distance^(.5 2)  0.622***   
  (0.102)   
     
FP term 2 Distance^(.5 2)  -0.040***   
  (0.009)   
     
Constant -4.295*** -4.494*** 2.074*** -3.089*** 
 (0.305) (0.314) (0.360) (0.288) 
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.209*** 0.108*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.051) (0.029) 
     
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.690*** 0.686*** 0.893 0.545*** 
 (0.167) (0.166) (0.238) (0.158) 
     
AIC 11292.278 11289.427 67958.415 11069.698 
Observations Level 1: 12414 
Level 2: 9484 
Level 3: 96 
Level 1: 9936 
Level 2: 7942 
Level 3: 96 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A4. Contact and distance interaction models 
To look at a more complex specification of inter-ethnic contact, we include simplified versions of the 
quality and quantity contact variables, collapsing quality (originally a seven-point scale ascertaining 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐǁĂƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŽƌŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚŽĂƚŚƌĞĞ-point 
scale (-1 = negative; 0 = indifferent; +1 positive) and quantity into a three-point scale (1 = monthly or 
less; 2 = at weekly or less; 3 = daily or less). For the distance interaction with quantity, we treat the 
four-point scale, which re-ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĂƐĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĐĂůǀĂƌŝďůĞ ?ƵƐŝŶŐ ‘ŶŽ
ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨerence. 
 
Table 1. Contact (quality / quantity) and distance interaction models 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017 Quality*quantity of 
contact 
Distance*quantity 
of contact 
   
Female 0.044 -0.051 
 (0.059) (0.055) 
Age -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Secondary school 0.868*** 0.865*** 
 (0.080) (0.075) 
Intermediate 1.420*** 1.356*** 
 (0.087) (0.080) 
Technical / none 1.357*** 1.356*** 
 (0.113) (0.104) 
Subjective deprivation 0.415*** 0.486*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) 
Urban -0.114 -0.004 
 (0.077) (0.073) 
Distance (10kms) 0.393*** 0.147 
 (0.083) (0.231) 
Distance2 (10kms) -0.064*** -0.042 
 (0.017) (0.048) 
Contact quality -0.682***  
 (0.128)  
Contact frequency -0.011  
 (0.044)  
Contact quality * Contact frequency -0.190***  
 (0.052)  
Contact: Monthly  -1.141*** 
  (0.230) 
Contact: Weekly  -1.473*** 
  (0.218) 
Contact: Daily  -1.674*** 
  (0.210) 
Monthly * Distance  0.246 
  (0.260) 
Weekly * Distance  0.064 
  (0.250) 
Daily * Distance  0.435 
  (0.245) 
Monthly * Distance2   -0.032 
  (0.054) 
Weekly * Distance2   0.022 
  (0.053) 
Daily * Distance2  -0.070 
  (0.053) 
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2) -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
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Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) 0.007 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.155*** 0.157*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3)  -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployed % dép. (Level 3) 0.089*** 0.083*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) 
Constant -3.743*** -2.839*** 
 (0.367) (0.393) 
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.038* 0.057** 
 (0.017) (0.019) 
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.740*** 0.771*** 
 (0.196) (0.175) 
AIC 9794.213 11187.156 
Observations Level 1: 11914 
Level 2: 9194 
Level 3: 96 
Level 1: 12414 
Level 2: 9484 
Level 3: 96 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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A5. Main mediation path model
Table 1. Main GSEM mediation path model, full estimates 
 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017  
  
  
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2) -0.013 
 (0.009) 
  
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) -0.002 
 (0.008) 
  
Unemployed % dép. (Level 3) 0.059** 
 (0.019) 
  
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.145*** 
 (0.029) 
  
Age 0.028 
 (0.014) 
  
Female -0.058 
 (0.070) 
  
Education - secondary  0.596*** 
 (0.094) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.814*** 
 (0.098) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.918*** 
 (0.128) 
  
Cultural threat 0.332*** 
 (0.026) 
  
Economic threat 0.301*** 
 (0.026) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.294** 
 (0.099) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.044* 
 (0.020) 
  
Urban 0.157 
 (0.091) 
  
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
  
Govt. reduces inequality 0.029 
 (0.024) 
  
Same-sex marriage 0.054*** 
 (0.016) 
  
Law and order 0.275*** 
 (0.024) 
  
Populism 0.211*** 
 (0.037) 
  
Euroscepticism 1.192*** 
 (0.063) 
  
Age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.076 
 (0.046) 
  
Uni educated % IRIS (Level 2) -0.019*** 
 (0.005) 
  
M1[ID_LEVEL3] 1.000 
 (.) 
  
M2[ID_LEVEL3>ID_IRIS_COG15
_x] 
1.000 
 (.) 
  
Constant -8.673*** 
 (0.612) 
Cultural threat  
Age 0.031*** 
 (0.007) 
  
Female 0.027 
 (0.038) 
  
Education - secondary  0.432*** 
 (0.048) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.759*** 
 (0.049) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.820*** 
 (0.070) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.207*** 
 (0.039) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.042*** 
 (0.009) 
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Age2 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.313*** 
 (0.024) 
  
Constant 2.207*** 
 (0.187) 
Economic threat  
Age 0.021*** 
 (0.006) 
  
Female 0.152*** 
 (0.033) 
  
Education - secondary  0.415*** 
 (0.041) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.757*** 
 (0.043) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.822*** 
 (0.061) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.231*** 
 (0.034) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.045*** 
 (0.008) 
  
Age2 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.326*** 
 (0.021) 
  
Constant 2.098*** 
 (0.162) 
Govt. reduces inequality  
Age 0.012* 
 (0.005) 
  
Female 0.219*** 
 (0.026) 
  
Education - secondary  0.361*** 
 (0.033) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.531*** 
 (0.034) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.482*** 
 (0.049) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.005 
 (0.027) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) 0.001 
 (0.006) 
  
Age2 -0.000 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.322*** 
 (0.017) 
  
Constant 4.066*** 
 (0.129) 
Same-sex marriage  
Age -0.009 
 (0.008) 
  
Female -0.317*** 
 (0.038) 
  
Education - secondary  0.059 
 (0.048) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.085 
 (0.050) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.180* 
 (0.071) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.064 
 (0.039) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.011 
 (0.009) 
  
Age2 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.110*** 
 (0.024) 
  
Constant 2.479*** 
 (0.188) 
Law and order  
Age 0.031*** 
 (0.007) 
  
Female 0.004 
 (0.036) 
  
Education - secondary  0.495*** 
 (0.045) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.843*** 
 (0.046) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.792*** 
 (0.066) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.160*** 
 (0.037) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.032*** 
 (0.008) 
  
Age2 -0.000** 
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 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.128*** 
 (0.023) 
  
Constant 3.051*** 
 (0.176) 
Populism  
Age 0.008* 
 (0.004) 
  
Female 0.036 
 (0.020) 
  
Education - secondary  0.276*** 
 (0.025) 
  
Education - intermediate 0.443*** 
 (0.026) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.428*** 
 (0.037) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.077*** 
 (0.021) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.012* 
 (0.005) 
  
Age2 -0.000** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.218*** 
 (0.013) 
  
Constant 3.076*** 
 (0.099) 
Euroscepticism  
Age 0.019*** 
 (0.003) 
  
Female 0.019 
 (0.013) 
  
Education - secondary  0.193*** 
 (0.016) 
  
Education  W intermediate 0.325*** 
 (0.017) 
  
Education - technical / none 0.331*** 
 (0.024) 
  
Distance (10kms) 0.085*** 
 (0.013) 
  
Distance2 (10kms) -0.018*** 
 (0.003) 
  
Age2 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Subjective deprivation 0.193*** 
 (0.008) 
  
Constant -1.380*** 
 (0.063) 
  
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.902*** 
 (0.254) 
  
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.021 
 (0.018) 
  
var(e.Cultural) 4.197*** 
 (0.053) 
  
var(e.Economic) 3.128*** 
 (0.040) 
  
var(e. Govt. reduces inequality) 2.001*** 
 (0.025) 
  
var(e. Same-sex marriage) 4.240*** 
 (0.054) 
  
var(e.Law and order) 3.700*** 
 (0.047) 
  
var(e.Populism) 1.174*** 
 (0.015) 
  
var(e.Euroscepticism) 0.479*** 
 (0.006) 
Observations 12414 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6. Second-Generation immigrants 
We run our models controlling for second-generation immigrant effects. To do so, we exclude 
respondents who were born in France but have at least one foreign-born parent. This results in an 
analytical sample of 11,910 respondents. As Table 1 shows, there is a small increase in the distance 
estimates, visible in the slightly higher probability at the mode of the fitted probability curve than in 
the original context model. This may be suggestive of voters with no immigrant background across 
two generations being more susceptible to the halo effect, but the difference is very small. We can 
conclude, certainly, that there is no evidence of any substantial differential within this smaller 
subsample.  
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Table 1. Context model of halo distance effect excluding first and second-generation immigrants
 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017 
 
2nd generation 
context 
  
Female -0.010 
 (0.055) 
Age 0.063*** 
 (0.012) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Education - secondary  0.905*** 
 (0.076) 
Education - intermediate 1.388*** 
 (0.081) 
Education - technical / none 1.472*** 
 (0.105) 
Subjective deprivation 0.443*** 
 (0.037) 
Distance (10kms) 0.410*** 
 (0.078) 
Distance2 (10kms)  -0.069*** 
 (0.016) 
Urban -0.017 
 (0.072) 
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2) -0.014* 
 (0.007) 
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) 0.010 
 (0.006) 
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.155*** 
 (0.028) 
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Unemployed % dép. (Level 3) 0.088*** 
 (0.019) 
Constant -6.199*** 
 (0.434) 
  
ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.051** 
 (0.018) 
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.689*** 
 (0.170) 
AIC 10854.131 
Observations Level 1: 11910 
Level 2: 9484  
Level 3: 96 
  
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Figure 1. Fitted probability for distance in context model, Table 1 
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A7. Non-European and European immigration 
We seek to address the issue of White European immigrants at contextual level potentially 
confounding non-European immigrant effect on PRR vote, given the expectation that such parties 
will mobilise support on the basis of opposition to non-European migration, principally. To that end, 
we obtained detailed nationality data from INSEE based on 13 categories (see Table 1). To measure 
the proportion of non-European immigrants, we sum categories 7 to 12; Europeans are computed as 
the sum of categories 2 to 6. These are expressed as percentages of the whole population. 
 
Table 1. INSEE classification of nationalities in 13 categories 
00 French by birth 
01 French by naturalization 
02 Portuguese 
03 Italian 
04 Spanish 
05 Other EU 
06 Other European 
07 Algerian 
08 Moroccan 
09 Tunisian 
10 Other African 
11 Turkish 
12 Other 
 
Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/1303686  
 
However, there are important limitations on these data, mostly due to national regulations 
concerning statistical confidentiality and the collection of ethnic statistics in France. First, census 
data are restricted to nationality of foreigners while our contextual models use the proportion of 
immigrants as a proxy for ethnic diversity at both local (IRIS) and departmental levels. Second, due 
to statistical confidentiality, census data are only available at a higher level of aggregation i.e. in 
statistical units with no less than 5,000 inhabitants. Such units may be small or mid-sized communes, 
as well as more densely populated neighbourhoods within larger urban areas (TRIRIS). TRIRISs 
generally consist of three smaller IRISs and they have about 5,000 inhabitants. To conform to French 
standards of statistical confidentiality, the dataset that was specifically compiled and provided by 
INSEE for the purpose of our analysis excluded all communes and TRIRIS with fewer than 5,000 
inhabitants, giving a total of 2,339 TRIRIS and 1,543 communes. This yielded an analytical sample of 
9,602.  
Initial descriptives of those TRIRIS or communes containing an IRIS with an immigrant population 
above 17.5%  W the cut-point for areas of high immigrant presence  W show a markedly lower rate of 
European nationality inhabitants than non-Europeans. In the 878 TRIRIS / communes within the 
survey, European nationality inhabitants account for a median of 4.4% of the population, with even 
the 99th centile only reaching 15.5%. Conversely, for non-European nationalities, the median is 
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12.1%, with the upper quartile reaching 16.6%. We are of course making the assumption here that 
European and non-European nationalities and migrant origins will cluster together. On this basis, 
there is no evidence that areas of high immigrant presence are associated with high levels of 
European provenance. 
The context model run using a pseudo-Level 2 variable based upon the TRIRIS/commune nationality 
proportions for European and non-European shows no impact of these nationalities (see Table 2). 
We would simply note an expected directionality to the nationality variables, particularly with higher 
levels of non-European nationality showing the stronger negative association with Le Pen vote, 
though not significant. Comparing this with the original context model specification, with the sample 
constrained to the same cases included in the TRIRIS/commune model, and replacing the nationality 
figures with the original IRIS immigration variable reveals almost identical parameter estimates for 
the halo effect. Overall, such evidence as there is suggests no bias from European nationalities, and 
if anything non-European effects aligning more with halo hypothesis.  
 
Table 2. Model of halo distance effect: Non-European and European immigrants 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017 European / non-
European 
nationality 
Context model 2 
(constrained 
sample) 
   
Female -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.063) (0.063) 
Age 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary school 0.887*** 0.887*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) 
Intermediate 1.303*** 1.304*** 
 (0.089) (0.089) 
Technical / none 1.489*** 1.489*** 
 (0.116) (0.116) 
Subjective deprivation 0.345*** 0.344*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Urban -0.120 -0.122 
 (0.116) (0.116) 
Distance (10kms) 0.340*** 0.336*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) 
Distance2 (10kms) -0.050* -0.049* 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
European nationality % (TRIRIS / commune) -0.270  
 (1.934)  
   
Non-European nationality % (TRIRIS / commune) -0.669  
 (0.926)  
   
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2)  -0.007 
  (0.007) 
   
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) 0.003 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
   
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.174*** 0.179*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
   
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3) -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
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Unemployed % dép. (Level 3) 0.121*** 0.119*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
Constant -6.812*** -6.807*** 
 (0.491) (0.490) 
   
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.043* 0.043* 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
   
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.522** 0.520** 
 (0.159) (0.159) 
AIC 8024.102 8021.688 
Observations Level 1: 9602; Level 2: 6568; Level 3: 96 
   
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A8. Ethnic change model of halo distance effect 
We test whether the halo may be picking up ethnic change over a ten-year period. Following 
Kaufmann (2017), we run our models using the 2006 and 2015 census data to calculate rate of 
change in the size of immigrant population. Ethnic change is computed as rate of change between 
2015 and 2006, with the 2006 proportion of immigrants in the home IRIS as the baseline (see table 
1). The 2006 level of immigrants comes close to significance, in the expected direction, with higher 
levels of immigrants in the home IRIS associated with lower levels of support for Le Pen. However, 
the rate of immigration has no effect. Reduced samples, excluding very high rates of increase in 
immigrant population, for example over 500% or 1000%, were run, but this had no effect on model 
findings. 
 
Table 1. Model of immigration change (2006-2015)  
  
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017  
  
Female -0.016 
 (0.055) 
Age 0.066*** 
 (0.011) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Education - secondary 0.903*** 
 (0.075) 
Intermediate 1.371*** 
 (0.079) 
Technical / none 1.481*** 
 (0.103) 
Subjective deprivation 0.432*** 
 (0.036) 
Distance (10kms) 0.398*** 
 (0.076) 
Distance2 (10kms) -0.066*** 
 (0.016) 
Urban -0.014 
 (0.071) 
Immigrant % IRIS, 2006 (Level 2) -0.014 
 (0.007) 
Immigrant rate change, 2006-15 -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) 0.005 
 (0.006) 
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.147*** 
 (0.029) 
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3)  -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Unemployed % dép.(Level 3) 0.086*** 
 (0.019) 
Constant -6.142*** 
 (0.434) 
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.056** 
 (0.019) 
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.693*** 
 (0.167) 
AIC 11177.102 
Observations Level 1: 12331 
Level 2: 9415 
Level 3: 96 
  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A9. Ethnic segregation model of halo distance effect 
We look at the effect of ethnic segregation in the IRIS of residence. We follow the literature 
emphasizing the effect of residential segregation (e.g. Biggs & Knauss 2012, Enos 2017). Here, the 
limits on French immigration data noted above pose a challenge. For both our Level 2 and Level 3 
spatial units, intra-unit segregation is not measurable or not meaningful, respectively. For IRIS, the 
area for the vast majority is simply too small to measure internal segregation; for the département, 
heterogeneity across different areas of such large territories will confound any measure of 
segregation. Instead, we follow a strategy of looking for evidence of segregation across IRIS. 
We build upon preliminary work in the UK by Hood et al (2018) on alternative halo specifications of 
spatial distributions of immigrant populations to look at the ratio of immigrant population in 
contiguous IRIS to the home IRIS. We calculate the ratio of immigrant proportion in an IRIS to the 
average of those of all contiguous IRIS.1 If the ratio is 1  W identical proportions in neighbouring IRIS 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽŵĞ ?/Z/^ W then we use this as an indicator of no segregation. If the ratio is either higher 
or lower, then we take that as an indication of higher segregation, higher values indicating 
immigrant communities surrounding a low-ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ‘ŚŽŵĞ ?ĂƌĞĂ. (A measure of simple 
segregation, irrespective of community, would take the inverse of the ratio for values below 1, to 
fold the scale). This is far from perfect as an indicator of segregation  W for example, larger-scale 
segregation may occur with clusters including non-contiguous IRIS. However, we do not have a 
better operationalisation, given data constraints and spatial level. Using this measure loses 15 IRIS 
from our data  W small offshore islands where there is no land contiguity  W and thereby 10 
respondents. 
The model in table 1 confirms this  W we fail to reject the null on this measure of segregation. As best 
as we can test this, then, we can find no evidence of a segregation effect at this level. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 We lose 57 respondents in areas with no immigrant population, and a further 10 respondents from IRIS with 
no contiguous boundaries  W small islands off the coast of metropolitan France. 
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Table 1. Model of contiguity measure of segregation  
 
First-round Le Pen vote, 2017  
Female -0.022 
 (0.055) 
Age 0.066*** 
 (0.011) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Education  W secondary school 0.899*** 
 (0.075) 
Education  W intermediate 1.368*** 
 (0.079) 
Education  W technical / none 1.478*** 
 (0.103) 
Subjective deprivation 0.435*** 
 (0.036) 
Distance (10kms) 0.402*** 
 (0.077) 
Distance2 (10kms)  -0.066*** 
 (0.016) 
Urban -0.007 
 (0.071) 
Contiguity ratio 0.033 
 (0.036) 
Immigrant % IRIS (Level 2) -0.013 
 (0.007) 
Unemployed % IRIS (Level 2) 0.008 
 (0.006) 
Immigrant % dép. (Level 3) 0.151*** 
 (0.028) 
Immigrant % dép.2 (Level 3) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Unemployed % dép. (Level 3) 0.080*** 
 (0.019) 
Constant -6.182*** 
 (0.434) 
ĠƉĂƌƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.052** 
 (0.018) 
/Z/^ ?>ĞǀĞů ? ?ʍ2 0.686*** 
 (0.166) 
AIC 11186.005 
Observations Level 1: 12347 
Level 2: 9427 
Level 3: 96 
  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
